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I. INTRODUCTION
International commercial arbitration is a dispute resolution method
between two or more parties who are contractually bound by the rules of a
private arbitral body.1 Parties voluntarily enter into contractual agreements
that require arbitration if a dispute arises for a more predictable, efficient,
and cost-effective dispute resolution method.2 As international arbitration
awards are subject to international treaties and conventions, parties may be
certain their awards are enforceable regardless of venue.3
In March 2018, a dispute arose in the Dubai International Financial
Centre-London Court of International Arbitration (“DIFC-LCIA”) between
Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation Company (“ALJ”) and FedEx
International Corporation.4 In July 2018, the District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee denied Abdul Latif Jameel’s request for discovery
citing a lack of authority to assist in discovery requests under 28 U.S.C. §
1782(a).5 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s opinion
1. Susan Gualtier, International Commercial Arbitration, HAUSER N.Y.U.L.:
HAUSER GLOBAL L. SCH. PROGRAM (Nov./Dec. 2014), https://www.nyulawglobal.org/
globalex/International_Commercial_Arbitration.html.
2. See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190–91 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995)) (noting that
arbitration’s popularity as a dispute resolution method can be attributed to its “efficiency
and cost-effectiveness”). See generally LATHAM&WATKINS, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (2017), https://www.lw.com/thoughtleadership/guide-to-international-
arbitration-2017 (attributing the rise of international commercial arbitration to
multilateral enforceability, neutral forums, procedural flexibility, arbitrators’ experience,
and party autonomy).
3. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards art. 2, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (enforcing foreign arbitral
awards among member states who are parties to the agreement).
4. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2019)
(explaining that the dispute between ALJ and FedEx arose from a General Service
Provider Agreement that was broken when FedEx partnered with an ALJ competitor).
5. In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F.3d
at 716; Order, In re Application of Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., No. 2:18-mc-00021
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2019) (denying Application for Judicial Assistance and holding
that the district court did not need to apply the discretionary factors laid out in Intel Corp.
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and remanded to the lower court to determine whether to grant discovery
under a test set forth in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.6 The
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation Co. v. FedEx
Corp.7 departed from the pre-Intel decisions of the Second and Fifth Circuits,
significantly altering the role of district courts in discovery assistance in
international commercial arbitration.8
This Comment will support the Sixth Circuit’s construction of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782(a) over the earlier constructions of the Second and Fifth Circuits
because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s expansion of a district court’s authority
to compel discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). Part II of this Comment will
first provide context surrounding the history, development, and current
domestic discovery practices of international commercial arbitration. Part II
will then discuss the evolution, modern statutory function, and traditional
tools used to interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). Part II will conclude by
discussing the Second and Fifth Circuits’ dicta on 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), the
influence of Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., and the procedural
history of Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation Co. v. FedEx Corp. Part III of
this Comment will analyze the construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) through
the statutory interpretation structure set forth in Part II. The tests established
in Intel will then be applied to Abdul Latif Jameel in affirmance of the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion. Part IV of this Comment will recommend that Congress
directly address this issue in a similar fashion to the 1964 Amendments to §
1782(a) to resolve the discrepancy between the Sixth Circuit opinion and the
opinions of the Second and Fifth Circuits.9 This Comment proposes that the
v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., where the district court lacked the authority to compel
discovery). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018) (granting district courts the
authority to assist in discovery requests from interested parties or arbitrators in an
international tribunal and authorizing the district court to control which, if any, materials
are discoverable and the procedure by which the materials are made discoverable —
without reliance on foreign practices).
6. 542 U.S. 241 (2004); In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign
Proceedings, 939 F.3d at 732 (reversing on the grounds that the district court had the
authority, but not the obligation, to assist in discovery); see Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264–
65 (recommending district courts consider the nature of the discovery request, the nature
of the tribunal, attempts to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions, and the
burden placed on the party against which the discovery is sought).
7. 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019).
8. See id. at 714; see also NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 185–86, 191
(2d Cir. 1999) (declining to grant district courts the authority to compel discovery in
international commercial arbitration, further prohibiting the district court from applying
the discretionary factors laid out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.); Kaz.
v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 1999) (following the Second Circuit in
declining to grant district courts the authority to compel discovery in international
commercial arbitration).
9. See Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 9(a), 78 Stat. 997; see also Harry
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U.S. Supreme Court review and affirm the Sixth Circuit’s decision and
clarify the district court’s role in international commercial arbitration.
II. DEVELOPMENT, HISTORY, ANDMODERN
APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)
Section 1782(a) allows district courts to assist in discovery requests in
international arbitration.10 Since the adoption of § 1782(a), the U.S. Supreme
Court has clarified the district court’s scope of authority, opening U.S. courts
to assist in foreign arbitration.11
a. The History of International Commercial Arbitration
International commercial arbitration has long been used to resolve
disputes between private parties outside a traditional courtroom setting.12 As
international trade became increasingly more common, so too did
commercial arbitration as a cost-effective and less-burdensome alternative
to traditional legal action.13 English courts addressing merchant disputes
before the Industrial Era initially rejected arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution method by invalidating arbitration awards to force parties into
courts of common law.14 As England industrialized, the volume of
commercial disputes necessitated English Parliamentary action to recognize
arbitration agreements.15 England’s formalization of commercial arbitration
LeRoy Jones, A Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial
Procedure, 49 AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 379–80, 384 (1955) (detailing the need for Congress
to adopt liberal discovery standards in international arbitration to affirm the United
States’ role as a global economic leader and reverse previous economic and legal
isolationism).
10. See Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and
International Proceedings, 30VA. J. INT’LL. 597, 620 (1990) (noting that courts’ limited
role in international arbitration includes discovery assistance).
11. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 246–47, 264–65 (granting district courts the
authority to compel discovery in international arbitration under two four-part tests: (1)
the Intel authority test; and (2) the Intel discretionary factors test).
12. See Lynden Macassey, International Commercial Arbitration, — Its Origin,
Development and Importance, 24 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 518, 519–20 (1938) (finding an
increase in international trade, a separate body of commercial law, tedious and time-
consuming litigation, and the courts’ lack of familiarity with merchant disputes were
vital factors that led to an increase in international commercial arbitration).
13. See id. at 522–23 (detailing the rationale and rise of commercial arbitration
within the United States and outlining the mechanisms of international commercial
arbitration).
14. See id. at 520 (remarking that English courts had an “active hostility to
arbitration”).
15. See id. at 520–21 (highlighting English Parliament’s efforts to standardize and
enforce arbitral agreements and awards to promote trade).
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legitimized the practice and led the United States to adopt similar
legislation.16
The industrialization of the U.S. economy also brought Congress to
recognize and regulate arbitral agreements.17 In 1925, Congress passed the
Federal Arbitration Act, which recognized domestic arbitral agreements and
permitted arbitrators to petition a federal court to assist in discovery
requests.18 Following the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act, U.S. courts
lacked the authority to assist in foreign arbitration on behalf of arbitrators or
interested parties.19
b. The Statutory History of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)
Until 1854, foreign litigants could successfully petition U.S. courts to
assist in discovery through letters rogatory and commissions.20 Because
international litigation was far more difficult in the pre-Industrial era, no
record exists of a foreign litigant exercising this privilege.21 In 1855,
Attorney General Caleb Cushing issued an opinion letter prohibiting U.S.
courts from authorizing discovery pursuant to a French court’s letter
rogatory.22
16. See Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the
United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 246 (1928) (recognizing Parliament’s 1889
arbitration legislation as the main inspiration for the Federal Arbitration Act).
17. See Gabriel Herrmann, Discovering Policy Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 780 (2003) (describing the Federal Arbitration Act as a
“concrete expression of the new federal policy favoring arbitration”); cf. Jay E. Grenig,
Evolution of the Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Resolving Employment
Disputes, 71 DISP. RESOL. J. 99, 105–07 (2016) (enumerating state government actions
recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements before the passage of the Federal
Arbitration Act).
18. See Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, Pub. L No. 80-282, § 4, 61 Stat. 671 (codified
as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2018)) (permitting arbitrators to petition a district court for
any evidence of value to arbitration and further authorizing district courts to hold parties
of an arbitration in contempt of court if they fail to comply with the court order).
19. CompareMichael Campion Miller et al., 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and the Evolution of
International Judicial Assistance in United States Courts, FED. LAW., May 2012, at 44,
44 (detailing Congress’s initial unwillingness to provide judicial assistance to foreign
discovery requests), with Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, §§ 2, 43, 44 (Eng., Wales, & N.
Ir.) (requiring permission of all interested parties or the tribunal to procure evidence for
use in an international commercial arbitration).
20. SeeMiller et al., supra note 19, at 44 (citing case law tending to show that U.S.
courts understood they had the authority to compel discovery on behalf of foreign
litigants).
21. See, e.g., id. (recognizing the inability of merchants to participate in foreign legal
proceedings without a means to quickly travel across the Atlantic Ocean).
22. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 3,
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (citing 7 Op. Att’y
Gen. 56 (1855)) (outlining the difficulty in conducting international legal matters due to
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In an attempt to override the Attorney General’s obstruction of discovery
requests, Congress passed legislation that would have granted district courts
the authority to assist in discovery requests; however, the law was lost and
never enacted.23 Instead of replacing the lost legislation, Congress changed
its course in 1863, limiting discovery for use in foreign litigation where the
foreign country is an interested party and “at peace” with the United States.24
Although discovery aid was requested under this new authority, no federal
record exists of any granted request.25 Foreign litigants relied on state courts
to assist in discovery requests, which was met with scrutiny from domestic
and international commentators.26
In 1948, Congress readopted the core principles of the previously lost
1855 Act, codifying the statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1782.27 The original text of §
1782 kept the 1863 Act’s requirement that the foreign nation be “at peace”
with the United States.28 The first iteration also required that the discovery
request be in connection with a civil action in a foreign court.29 Under the
newly passed statute, testimony could only be procured from witnesses
residing within the United States.30
In 1949, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to further liberalize
discovery aid to foreign decisionmakers.31 Congress eliminated the
requirement that witnesses reside in the United States and authorized district
indexing errors and poor communication).
23. See Miller et al., supra note 19, at 44 (attributing the loss of the statute to “a
comedy of errors . . . , a series of indexing mishaps result[ing] in the act literally
becoming lost and accordingly disregarded by the federal courts”).
24. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 95, § 1, 12 Stat. 769; Miller et al., supra note 19, at
44 (theorizing Congress’s shift away from liberal discovery in foreign courts resulted
from international support for the Confederacy).
25. See Stahr, supra note 10, at 601–02 (postulating that the lack of federal record
of a granted request was the result of barriers to international trade and the narrow
confines of the 1863 Act).
26. See id. at 602 (noting that state courts were more receptive to arbitral discovery
requests than federal district courts and crediting the start of World War II as the major
cause in delaying foreign discovery assistance reform).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2018); see Stahr, supra note 10, at 602–03 (crediting the
discovery of the lost 1855 Act as the impetus for adopting § 1782 in 1948); see also
Miller et al., supra note 19, at 44–45 (hypothesizing that the liberal approach to foreign
discovery assistance was inspired by the United States’ commitment to the newly-formed
United Nations).
28. SeeMiller et al., supra note 19, at 45.
29. See id.
30. See id. (including temporary residents as persons residing in the United States
for purposes of § 1782(a) discovery).
31. See Stahr, supra note 10, at 602–03 (clarifying that the 1949 Amendments were
corrections made by Congress to conform to the 1855 Act).
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courts to assist in discovery requests in judicial proceedings, not just civil
actions.32
In 1964, Congress broadened the scope of § 1782 by allowing discovery
aid for use in foreign tribunals, permitting district courts to grant requests
from any interested person, and omitting the requirement that the foreign
nation be “at peace” with the United States.33 By embracing liberal
discovery aid in international litigation and arbitration, Congress hoped that
other countries would follow the precedent set forth in § 1782; although,
foreign nations have been apprehensive to adopt the same standard.34
c. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) Modern Statutory Language
Congress created two routes for discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. While
§ 1782(b)35 permits a person within the United States to voluntarily give
testimony for use in an international tribunal, § 1782(a) grants authority to
district courts to compel discovery for use in international tribunals. Section
1782(a) sets forth:
The district court . . . may order him to give his testimony . . . for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal . . . . The order may be
made pursuant to a . . . request made, by a foreign or international tribunal
or upon the application of any interested person . . . . The order may
prescribe the practice and procedure . . . . A person may not be compelled
to give his testimony . . . in violation of any legally applicable privilege.36
Upon passage of § 1782(a) in 1964, the Senate published a report detailing
the purpose and intent behind enacting the statute.37 This report, in part,
32. See id. at 603 (opening the door for federal courts to provide discovery aid to
those residing outside of the United States if they have availed themselves of U.S. laws);
id. (describing Congress’s intent in changing the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in 1949
as an effort to conform the statute with the 1855 Act); see also Miller et al., supra note
19, at 45.
33. SeeMiller et al., supra note 19, at 45–46; Stahr, supra note 10, at 605–06 (noting
the functional overlap of the Trading with the Enemy Act and the peace requirement of
§ 1782).
34. See Stahr, supra note 10, at 604 (“The general purpose of the [§ 1782]
changes . . . was to provide ‘wide judicial assistance . . . on a wholly unilateral basis’ . . .
[and] ‘equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants
involved in litigation with international aspects’”); see alsoMarat A. Massen, Discovery
for Foreign Proceedings after Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices: A Critical Analysis of
28 U.S.C. § 1782 Jurisprudence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 885 (2010) (“The perceived
intrusiveness of American discovery has led civil law nations to enact blocking statutes
or other legal obstacles to American encroachment on their legal systems.”).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(b) (2018).
36. Id. § 1782(a).
37. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3782
(explaining that the legislative aim of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) is to improve the effectiveness
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relied upon an article by Hans Smit to justify the Senate’s liberalization of §
1782(a).38
d. Methods and Presumptions in Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation must begin with a determination that a given
statute is ambiguous or contains ambiguous terms.39 Only in cases where a
plain reading of unambiguous terms would clash with the intentions of the
drafters should courts interfere with such a construction.40 As congressional
drafters have remained silent as to whether unambiguous terms in § 1782(a)
are being improperly applied, only the construction of ambiguous terms
should be considered.41
In the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), “foreign or international
tribunal” is an ambiguous term used throughout the statute.42 A plain reading
of the statute does not indicate to what extent quasi-judicial bodies must
interact with a foreign nation’s government to be considered a “foreign or
international tribunal.”43 As a result, traditional tools for statutory
interpretation may be relied upon to resolve ambiguity.44
When deciphering ambiguous language, courts should assume that
Congress intended the term follow its “customary meaning.”45 This is a
of international litigation).
38. Id. at 3784 (citing Hans Smit, Assistance Rendered by the United States in
Proceedings Before International Tribunals, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1264 (1962)
[hereinafter Smit, Assistance Rendered]); see also id. at 3788–89; Hans Smit,
International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1033–
34 (1965) [hereinafter Smit, International Litigation].
39. United States v. Inv. Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Except in
rare circumstances, judicial inquiry is complete when the terms of a statute are
unambiguous.”).
40. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (limiting judicial interference in a plainly
unambiguous statute to rare instances where the applied statute produces a result
inconsistent with the drafters’ intent).
41. Cf. id.
42. See, e.g., Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to
Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710, 726 (6th Cir. 2019)
(identifying “tribunal” as an ambiguous term).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018) (failing to specify what qualifies as a “foreign or
international tribunal”).
44. Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Only where
doubt or ambiguity resides . . . may legislative history and other tools of interpretation
beyond a plain reading of the statute’s words be utilized to shed light on verbiage that is
unclear.”).
45. United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 833 F.3d 671, 674 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)) (“In the absence of any statutory
definition to the contrary, courts assume that Congress adopts the customary meaning of
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context-based approach and presumes that the same term used multiple times
in the same statute has the same meaning throughout.46
Statutes rarely stand alone, free from the explicit control or implicit
influence of other statutes or legal frameworks.47 Therefore, courts should
assume, absent evidence of a direct conflict, that statutes coexist to form a
larger statutory scheme.48 Courts should also assume that Congress repeals
statutes explicitly.49
e. Initial Attempts to Determine the Scope of § 1782(a):
The Role of the Second and Fifth Circuits
In 1999, the Second and Fifth Circuits decided NBC v. Bear Stearns50 and
Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International,51 respectively. These
cases concluded that Congress did not intend for § 1782(a) to apply to
international commercial tribunals.52
In NBC, the Second Circuit declined to extend authority to the Southern
District of New York to grant a discovery request under § 1782(a) to NBC
for use in an international commercial tribunal.53 NBC sought to compel
discovery from TV Azteca, a Mexican television broadcast company,
through TV Azteca’s investment firm, Bear Stearns, for use in an
International Chamber of Commerce arbitral tribunal.54 The Second Circuit
the terms it uses.”).
46. Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d
1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (presuming identical words have the same meaning
throughout a statutory scheme, especially when the word serves the same purpose
throughout).
47. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000)
(finding that Congress typically intends for statutes to work within a cohesive system
that does not needlessly repeal or supersede related statutes); see also Joseph B. Judkins,
The Rise of Footnote 9 (And Why Some TCJA Regulations Fail Chevron Step One),
TAXES THE TAXMAG., Mar. 2020, at 51, 51–52, 56 (clarifying that courts interpret the
statutory scheme established by the legislature).
48. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133; see also Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296
U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (“Where there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be
given to both if possible.”).
49. Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503 (“The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are
not favored.”).
50. 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999).
51. 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999).
52. NBC, 165 F.3d at 191; Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883.
53. NBC, 165 F.3d at 191 (“Opening the door to the type of discovery sought by
NBC in this case likely would undermine one of the significant advantages of arbitration,
and . . . would stand in stark contrast to the limited evidence gathering provided in 9
U.S.C. § 7 . . . .”).
54. Id. at 185–86.
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found that the text of § 1782(a) does not necessarily exclude an International
Chamber of Commerce arbitral tribunal, but rather, legislative history and
the limitations of the Federal Arbitration Act imply that Congress did not
intend for this tribunal to receive judicial assistance.55
In Biedermann, the Fifth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s framework
regarding whether the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce was contemplated by the drafters of § 1782(a).56 The Republic
of Kazakhstan sought to procure several documents and a deposition from a
nonparty for use in arbitration in the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.57
The Fifth Circuit relied upon statutory history and the limitations of the
Federal Arbitration Act.58 The Fifth Circuit’s opinion gave great weight to
the fear that § 1782(a) allows foreign parties to circumvent traditional
discovery techniques in their country or through their arbitral body.59
Despite the agreement between the Second and Fifth Circuits, in 2004, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
altering the standards employed by district courts to determine whether to
grant a discovery request in connection with international arbitration.60
Following Intel, the Second and Fifth Circuit opinions hold significantly less
precedential value.61
f. An Avenue for Granting International Arbitration Discovery Requests:
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., providing guidance to district courts contemplating a
discovery request under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).62 Advanced Micro Devices
(“AMD”) filed an antitrust complaint against Intel with the Directorate-
55. See id. at 187, 188–90 (observing ambiguity in the statute and relying upon
traditional methods of statutory interpretation).
56. Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 881, 883.
57. Id. at 881.
58. See id. at 881–83 (remarking that it would be improper to think that Congress
intended for international arbitration to be afforded a more liberal discovery standard
than domestic arbitration).
59. See id. at 883 (noting that Congress likely did not authorize federal courts to
provide parties in foreign private arbitration more discovery aid than they are provided
in domestic arbitration).
60. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264–65 (2004).
61. See, e.g., In re Children’s Inv. Fund Found., 363 F. Supp. 3d 361, 368–70
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (questioning NBC’s applicability following Intel Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc.).
62. See generally Intel Corp., 542 U.S. 241 (providing two four-pronged inquiries
regarding § 1782 and the district court’s role in discovery requests for matters engaged
in foreign or international arbitration).
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General for Competition of the Commission of the European Communities,
a branch of the European Union.63 AMD failed to persuade the Directorate-
General to seek documents from Intel in a separate antitrust suit in an
Alabama federal court.64 AMD then petitioned the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California to order Intel to produce the documents
under § 1782(a).65 The district court did not believe § 1782(a) authorized
discovery and denied the request.66 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion to extend authority to the Northern District of California to assist in
discovery.67
The U.S. Supreme Court in Intel clarified the four-part inquiry into
whether a district court has the authority to assist in discovery requests.68
The application must be by an “interested person” seeking testimony or
documents free from privilege for use in a reasonably contemplated
proceeding before a “foreign or international tribunal” regardless of the
foreign nation’s discovery practices.69
The U.S. Supreme Court further established a four-part inquiry into
whether a district court should grant discovery requests.70 First, district
courts should consider whether the petitioner is a party or interested person
in the litigation.71 Then, the district court should determine whether the
request is “an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions.”72
Next, it must determine whether the request is “unduly intrusive or
63. Id. at 246.
64. See id. at 250–51.
65. See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. C-01-7033 MISC WAI,
2002 WL 1339088, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2002).
66. Id.
67. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 246, 266–67. See generally Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying the request without considering
the Intel discretionary factors).
68. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 246.
69. Id. at 261 (“Section 1782 is a provision for assistance to tribunals abroad. It does
not direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to determine whether
analogous proceedings exist here.”); see Miller et al., supra note 19, at 45 (noting that
the change in language to § 1782 means that “assistance is not confined to proceedings
before conventional courts . . . [and] extends to administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings all over the world”).
70. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 246–47.
71. Id. at 264 (finding that AMD is an interested person under § 1782(a) and
declining to limit the inquiry to litigants only).
72. Id. at 265. Compare id. (permitting district courts to consider foreign-
discoverability requirements when granting discovery requests), with id. at 263
(prohibiting district courts from considering foreign-discoverability requirements when
determining their authority to assist in discovery).
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burdensome.”73 Finally, the district court must consider the nature of the
foreign tribunal and its receptivity to federal court assistance.74 Following
Intel, district courts exercised the tests set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court
when deciding whether to grant a request under § 1782(a).75
g. The Sixth Circuit’s Interpretation of § 1782(a) in
Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation Co. v. FedEx Corp.
A party may be subject to arbitration resulting from operations within a
special economic zone.76 Special economic zones operate outside the
economic and regulatory schemes of the founding nation to provide a
conducive business environment for foreign investors.77 One such special
economic zone, the Dubai International Financial Centre (“DIFC”), subjects
parties to arbitration through the Dubai International Financial Centre-
London Court of International Arbitration.78 The DIFC-LCIA arbitrates
disputes under the London Court of International Arbitration Rules.79
Following a contractual dispute with FedEx International Corporation,
Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation Company, a private Saudi corporation,
petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee for
assistance in discovery for documents related to the performance of the
73. Id. at 265 (balancing the amount at issue in the dispute with the burden of the
request and necessitating that the burden on the party against which the discovery is
sought be unduly intrusive or overly burdensome as any discovery request is a burden).
74. Id. at 264 (emphasizing the need for the tribunal to be receptive to the requested
documents; absent a clear and explicit prohibition on the discovery from the arbitral
panel, the tribunal is assumed to be receptive).
75. See, e.g., In re Application of Guy, No. M 19–96., 2004 WL 1857580, at *1–4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2004) (granting modified discovery assistance under Intel). But see
Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2004)
(declining to grant discovery assistance under Intel).
76. See TERESA CHENG, DEP’T OF JUSTICEGOV’T OFH.K. SPECIALADMIN. REGION,
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: A CATALYST FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
IN UNSETTLING TIMES? 31 (2019), https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/community_engagement/
speeches/pdf/sj20190211e1.pdf (highlighting the pervasiveness and utility of special
economic zones and describing the legal implications of joining a special economic
zone).
77. See id. at 4 (explaining the allure of special economic zones to foreign investors).
78. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710, 715 (6th Cir. 2019)
(explaining the rules and procedures for the DIFC-LCIA); About, DUBAI INT’L FIN. CTR.,
https://www.difc.ae/about/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) (detailing the DIFC’s commitment
to foreign investment and consistent legal standards).
79. Overview, DIFC-LCIA ARB. CTR. [hereinafter Overview, DIFC-LCIA ARB.
CTR.], http://difc-lcia.org/overview.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) (describing the
DIFC-LCIA as an arbitral body governed by English arbitration laws subject to limited
review by the governments of Dubai and United Arab Emirates).
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contract.80 The district court denied ALJ’s request, citing a lack of authority
in § 1782(a) to compel discovery in connection with a private international
tribunal; on appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district
court to decide whether the request should be granted.81 Although this
dispute has yet to be resolved, this decision created a conflict between the
liberal Sixth Circuit’s interpretation and the restrictive Second and Fifth
Circuits’ interpretations.82
III. PERMISSIVE CONTEMPLATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
TRIBUNALS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals properly ruled in Abdul Latif Jameel
Transportation Co. v. FedEx Corp. that district courts have the authority, but
not the obligation, to assist in discovery requests from interested parties in
arbitration before a foreign or international tribunal, such as the DIFC-LCIA,
under the test put forth in Intel.83
a. The Intel Test for District Court Authority
The Sixth Circuit properly applied the test set out in Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices Inc. when determining the authority of district
courts to assist in discovery. The Sixth Circuit was correct in granting the
authority to the Western District of Tennessee to assist in discovery,
regardless of whether discovery assistance would be provided on remand.84
The first prong of the four-step inquiry into a district court’s authority to
compel discovery requires a court to examine whether the request comes
from an interested person seeking documents or testimony.85 The U.S.
80. In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F.3d
at 714–15 (identifying ALJ’s cause for the dispute as FedEx’s acquisition of TNT
Express, N.V., an ALJ competitor in Saudi Arabia, the lack of communication between
FedEx and ALJ regarding the acquisition, and the nonrenewal of the General Service
Provider Agreement).
81. See id. at 732 (allowing, but not obligating, the Western District of Tennessee to
assist in ALJ’s discovery request).
82. Compare id. (granting authority and allowing the district court to address the
Intel discretionary factors), with Kaz. v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 880 (5th Cir.
1999) (denying authority to assist in a discovery request for litigants in private
international arbitration proceedings), and NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184,
185 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1782(a) does not compel district courts to assist in
discovery requests for proceedings heard before a private arbitration panel).
83. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004).
84. See id. at 264 (“[A] district court is not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery
application simply because it has the authority to do so.”); In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F.3d at 732 (noting that the trial court is
in the best position to make a case-by-case determination of the Intel factors).
85. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 256 (arguing that, as a complainant, AMD should
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Supreme Court in Intel plainly read § 1782(a) to broadly include any
interested person.86 ALJ is a party to the arbitration and, therefore, has an
interest under § 1782(a) to request documents or testimony.87 ALJ made
seventy-nine production requests from FedEx in connection with the
arbitration and requested all documents concerning the ALJ-FedEx contract
from the district court under § 1782(a).88 As such, the first prong of the Intel
authority inquiry is satisfied.
The second prong prevents a district court from assisting in discovery
requests of privileged materials.89 Lower courts had been divided on
whether this inquiry should include a foreign-discoverability rule.90 In Intel,
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the foreign-discoverability rule and, in its
place, required courts to determine whether the requested documents are
subject to “any legally applicable privilege.”91 As Intel struck down the
foreign-discoverability requirement, and ALJ’s requested materials are not
subject to privilege, this prong is satisfied.92
The third prong grants a district court authority to assist in discovery in a
reasonably contemplated proceeding.93 The 1964 Amendments to § 1782(a)
not be included as an “interested person” and should only be afforded “limited rights”).
86. Id. at 256–57 (quoting Smit, International Litigation, supra note 38, at 1027)
(“‘[A]ny interested person’ is ‘intended to include not only litigants before foreign or
international tribunals, but also foreign and international officials as well as any other
person whether he be designated by foreign law or international convention or merely
possess a reasonable interest in obtaining assistance.’”).
87. See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939
F.3d at 714; see also Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 256 (explaining that litigants are considered
“interested person[s]” and are, therefore, eligible to invoke § 1782(a)).
88. Brief for the Respondent-Appellee FedEx Corp. at 11–12, Abdul Latif Jameel
Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign
Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 24); In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F.3d at 716.
89. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 259–61.
90. See, e.g., Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1098 (2d Cir. 1995)
(declining to authorize a foreign-discoverability rule as U.S. judges are only permitted
to interpret U.S. legal standards). But see, e.g., In re Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d
1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988) (remanding to the district court to determine whether the
evidentiary rules of Hong Kong would permit discovery).
91. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 259–63 (prohibiting discovery of privileged materials
under the discovery procedures of the United States, the foreign nation, or the arbitration
tribunal).
92. See Reply Brief for Movant-Appellant Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. at 7 n.3,
Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery
for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 27) (noting §
1782(a)’s exclusion of any privileged materials).
93. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 259 (“Instead, we hold that § 1782(a) requires only
that a dispositive ruling by the Commission, reviewable by the European courts, be
within reasonable contemplation.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018) (“The district
2020 AUTHORIZATION OFDISCOVERY 431
removed the requirement that the proceeding be pending.94 Instead, the 1964
Amendments require a reasonably contemplated proceeding to petition a
court under § 1782(a).95 Since 1964, one amendment was made to § 1782(a)
in 1996, affording the same discovery privileges to foreign criminal
investigations.96 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Intel, the 1996
amendment sought to expand the scope of the reasonably contemplated
proceeding prong.97 The appellees do not contest the third prong of the Intel
authority inquiry and thus this prong is satisfied.98
The final prong of the Intel authority inquiry requires that the discovery
request be in connection with a “foreign or international tribunal.”99 A
“foreign or international tribunal” is ambiguous and thus courts should
primarily rely upon traditional and customary usage of the term before
relying upon legislative history.100
Courts may resolve the ambiguity of a term by looking at how the term is
used elsewhere in the statutory scheme.101 The preceding section, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1781, contains the only other instance of “foreign or international tribunal”
in the statutory scheme and, likewise, does not explicitly include or exclude
private arbitral bodies.102 The Second and Fifth Circuits improperly assumed
that because the statute does not explicitly include private arbitral bodies,
then, by negative inference, these bodies must be excluded.103
court . . . may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or
other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal . . . .”).
94. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 9(a), 78 Stat. 997.
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
96. See id.
97. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 259 (noting that the 1996 amendment affirms the
U.S. Supreme Court’s construction of § 1782(a)).
98. See generally Corrected Brief for Respondent-Appellee FedEx Corp., Abdul
Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use
in Foreign Proceedings,), 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 26) (foregoing the
opportunity to argue that the proceeding has not reached the level of reasonable
contemplation).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
100. E.g., In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939
F.3d at 726–27 (concurring with the Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit opinions that
“foreign or international tribunal” is an ambiguous term).
101. See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260
F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that when a word is used in two different
sections of a statutory scheme, the rule is to assume the words have the same intended
meaning).
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (“The Department of State has power . . . to receive a letter
rogatory issued . . . by a foreign or international tribunal . . . .”).
103. Compare NBC v. Bear Stearns, & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1999) (relying
upon the lack of congressional contemplation of private arbitral bodies to negatively infer
that those bodies were intentionally excluded), and Kaz. V. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d
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Absent a clear statutory definition, courts should consider the customary
meaning of an ambiguous term.104 Before the adoption of § 1782(a) in 1948,
the U.S. Supreme Court often referred to purely commercial arbitral bodies
as “tribunals.”105 During the formative years between the adoption of §
1782(a) and the 1964 Amendments, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to
refer to such bodies as “tribunals.”106 Following the 1964 Amendments of §
1782(a), the U.S. Supreme Court continued to refer to purely commercial
arbitral bodies as “tribunals.”107 The Second and Fifth Circuits failed to
address the customary usage of “tribunals” when determining district court
authority; therefore, the Second and Fifth Circuits prematurely relied upon a
restrictive construction of § 1782(a)’s legislative history.108
While traditional legal usage suggests that international commercial
arbitration resides within the contemplation of § 1782(a), the U.S. Supreme
Court provides that a tribunal is within the scope of § 1782(a) where it
functions as a “first-instance decisionmaker.”109 The DIFC-LCIA arbitrates
disputes as a “first-instance decisionmaker” as it permits the submission and
gathering of evidence, imposes liability and awards on parties, and is subject
to limited judicial review.110 Given that the traditional and customary legal
880, 882 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying extending § 1782(a) to private international
arbitrations because Congress did not include international commercial arbitration in the
statute’s language), with Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 344–45 (1997)
(discouraging the use of negative inferences in statutory construction).
104. See United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 833 F.3d 671, 674 (6th Cir. 2016)
(recognizing that courts rely upon a context-based approach to determine the customary
meaning of an ambiguous term).
105. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121 n.1 (1924) (citing
Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 800, 821 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1845)) (discussing private
arbitration where parties appoint the arbitrators as a “tribunal”).
106. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (recognizing
a dispute before the American Arbitration Association as a proceeding before a
“tribunal”).
107. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S.
614 (1985) (referring to an arbitration pursuant to a private contract as a proceeding
before a “transnational tribunal” and a “foreign tribunal”).
108. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 188–90 (examining House and Senate reports pertaining
to § 1782); see also Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 881 (following the precedent set by the
Second Circuit of reviewing the language and legislative history of the statute).
109. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246–47 (2004); see
also id. at 257 (noting that a “first-instance decisionmaker” resolves disputes and may,
but need not, collect proof from parties); e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 623
(“[T]he court directed the District Court to consider in the first instance how the parallel
judicial and arbitral proceedings should go.”). See generally S. REP. No. 88-1580 (1964),
as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782 (providing background about sections of the
U.S. Code concerning international litigation and their proposed amendments).
110. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, supra note 3, art. 5 (reviewing arbitral awards where there was a procedural
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usage, legislative history, and the considerations put forth in Intel all imply
that commercial arbitration is within the scope of § 1782(a), the Sixth Circuit
properly extended the authority, but not the obligation, to the district court
to assist in discovery.111
b. The Intel Test for Granting Discovery
The Sixth Circuit properly deferred to the district court to determine
whether to grant ALJ’s discovery requests on remand.112 On review,
appellate courts should not decide discretionary matters traditionally left to
lower courts.113 As at least one of the Intel discretionary factors is a fact-
intensive review, the Sixth Circuit properly recused itself from deciding
whether to grant the discovery requests.114 The U.S. Supreme Court laid out
a four-part inquiry for lower courts to consider when granting discovery.115
The first Intel discretionary factor favors FedEx.116 When determining
whether to grant discovery requests, district courts should consider whether
the request was made to a participant to the dispute.117 ALJ sought contract
performance documents from FedEx International, a subsidiary of FedEx
Corporation, through the parent entity.118 As ALJ could discover these
deficiency, the incapacity of one or more parties, or the jurisdiction was improper, but
not where the substance of the arbitral agreement is at issue). But see Pak. v. Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, No. 18-103 (D.D.C. signed Apr. 10, 2019) (labeling the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Tribunal as a tribunal
contemplated under § 1782(a) despite the lack of judicial review).
111. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710, 730–31 (6th Cir. 2019).
112. See id. at 732 (refusing to address the Intel discretionary factors).
113. See Davis v. Lifetime Capital, Inc., 560 F. App’x 477, 495 (6th Cir. 2014)
(leaving discretionary issues to the lower court unless the issue is “purely legal” or “in
the interest of judicial economy”).
114. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264 (remarking that district courts should review
§1782(a) requests); In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign
Proceedings, 939 F.3d at 731–32.
115. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264–65 (recommending courts should consider
whether the requested material is within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the nature of the
tribunal and its receptivity to the requested materials, whether the request is “an attempt
to circumvent foreign proof–gathering restrictions,” and whether the request is “unduly
intrusive or burdensome”).
116. See id. at 264 (“First, when the person from whom discovery is sought is a
participant in the foreign proceeding (as Intel is here), the need for § 1782(a) aid
generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a
nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad.”).
117. See id. (“[N]onparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign
tribunal’s jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in the United States, may
be unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid.”).
118. In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F.3d
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documents through the DIFC-LCIA evidentiary rules, the first discretionary
factor favors FedEx.119
The second discretionary factor, a fact-intensive review of the nature of
the tribunal and its receptivity to the requested material, favors ALJ.120
Absent clear evidence that the tribunal would not be receptive to the
documents requested, this factor weighs in favor of the petitioners.121
Respondents have the burden of showing that the discovery would offend
the foreign jurisdiction.122 Given that there is no showing that the DIFC-
LCIA is deficient, and the DIFC-LCIA has not explicitly stated their
opposition to this discovery, the second discretionary factor favors ALJ.123
The third discretionary factor, whether the request is an attempt to
circumvent the tribunal’s discovery rules, favors FedEx.124 Article 34 of the
DIFC Arbitration Law provides that a party, with the consent of the tribunal,
may petition the DIFC courts to execute a discovery request.125 Because ALJ
has not petitioned the DIFC courts through the proper discovery channels,
their § 1782(a) request is an attempt to circumvent the tribunal’s discovery
at 714.
119. SeeCorrected Brief for Respondent-Appellee FedEx Corp., supra note 98, at 42–
45; see also In re Judicial Assistance Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 by Macquarie Bank
Ltd., No. 2:14-cv-00797-GMN-NJK, 2015 WL 3439103, at *14 (D. Nev. May 28, 2015)
(declining to grant a discovery request when the petitioner seeks discovery from a
separate, but related entity).
120. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264–65 (stating that multiple factors, including the
nature of the foreign tribunal, the characteristics of the proceedings underway abroad,
and the foreign government’s receptiveness are taken into account when presented with
a request).
121. E.g., Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1995)
(ruling that courts should reject evidence obtained under § 1782 if there is “authoritative
proof that a foreign tribunal” would not consider it).
122. See In reApplication Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for an Order Permitting Bayer
AG, 146 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding the opposing party had the burden of
demonstrating that the application should be denied based on the foreign jurisdiction or
any other relevant matter).
123. See Corrected Brief for Movant-Appellant at 48–49, Abdul Latif Jameel Transp.
Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign
Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 22) (“FedEx International failed to show
that the law governing the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration prohibited ALJ from seeking Section
1782 relief.”). See generally Corrected Brief for Respondent-Appellee FedEx Corp.,
supra note 98 (stating that DIFC Court’s denial of FedEx’s motion to enjoin ALJ’s §
1782 application is not proof of the court’s receptivity).
124. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 265.
125. DIFC, ARBITRATION LAW NO. 1 14 (2008), http://www.arbiter.com.sg/pdf/
laws/UAE%20DIFC%20Arbitration%20Law%20(2008).pdf (stating that, with the
Arbitral Tribunal’s approval, a party may request assistance from the DIFC Court in
taking evidence).
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rules.126
The fourth discretionary factor, whether the request is overly burdensome
or intrusive, favors ALJ.127 The discovery request by ALJ, although wide-
ranging, enjoys the presumption that the district court judge will limit
discovery to only the necessary documents.128 The burden must be
proportionally larger than the amount at issue in the arbitration.129 As over
$100 million is in dispute in this arbitration, the final discretionary factor
favors ALJ.130
Since the first and third discretionary factors of the Intel inquiry favor
denying the discovery request, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee will likely deny ALJ’s request. Nevertheless, the Sixth
Circuit properly granted the authority to the district court on remand to
decide these four factors.
c. Reconciling NBC v. Bear Stearns and
Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International
In 1999, the Second and Fifth Circuits improperly decided NBC v. Bear
Stearns and Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International,
respectively.131 Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Intel, courts
in the Second and Fifth Circuits have called into question the applicability
and precedential value of the 1999 decisions.132 These courts correctly
126. See Corrected Brief for Respondent–Appellee FedEx Corp., supra note 98, at
48–49 (arguing that ALJ failed to seek approvals required by DIFC Arbitration Law “to
obtain the discovery sought in the § 1782 Application,” that ALJ is in violation of the
third-party discovery prohibition rules, and that ALJ seeks deposition testimony without
a proper “basis under DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Law or in the GSP Contract”).
127. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 265 (“[U]nduly intrusive or burdensome requests
may be rejected or trimmed.”).
128. See Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1995)
(preferring a district court limit the discoverable materials over outright rejection of a
broad discovery request).
129. See FDIC v. Ark-La-Tex Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 1:15 CV 2470, 2016 WL
3460236, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 24, 2016) (approving the review of tens of thousands of
documents in a $1.5 million dispute, arguing it is not “overly burdensome”).
130. See Reply Brief for Movant-Appellant Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., supra
note 92, at 24–25 (comparing the relative burden placed on the party against whom the
discovery is sought with the amount at issue in the dispute).
131. See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190–91 (2d Cir. 1999)
(concluding § 1782(a) did not apply to “an arbitral body established by private parties”
according to the statute’s text and the legislative history); see also Kaz. v. Biedermann
Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding the mention of “foreign and international
tribunals” in § 1782(a) was not an authorization for courts to assist with discovery in
international commercial arbitrations).
132. See, e.g., Ecuador v. Connor, 708 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 2013) (declining to
extend the holding in Biedermann following Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
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discounted the precedential value of NBC and Biedermann and, following
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in ALJ, all district courts should adopt this
liberalized discovery standard.133
i. Evaluating the Second and Fifth Circuits’ Reliance on Legislative
History
Both the Second and Fifth Circuit opinions rely upon legislative history to
interpret the ambiguous term, “foreign or international tribunal,” in §
1782(a).134 The Second and Fifth Circuits should not have immediately
relied upon legislative history where traditional tools of statutory
construction could have resolved the ambiguity.135 Analyzing statutory
history through congressional reports may not accurately reflect Congress’s
intent, only the intent of a majority of the legislators.136 While statutory
history and legislative intent may be helpful tools in resolving ambiguity,
they should not be viewed as dispositive evidence of a certain statutory
construction.137
ii. Repudiating the Second and Fifth Circuits’ Interpretation of the
Legislative History
Despite the arguments from the Second and Fifth Circuits, the legislative
history of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) provides that Congress may have intended
international commercial tribunals to fall within the scope of § 1782(a).138
Inc.); see also In re Children’s Inv. Fund Found., 363 F. Supp. 3d 361, 368–70 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (questioning NBC’s applicability following Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc.).
133. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710, 726–28 (6th Cir. 2019).
134. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 188–90 (analyzing the legislative history § 1782 to
interpret the statute); Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 881–82 (following the precedent set by
the court in NBC and using the legislative history to interpret § 1782).
135. See Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 539, 542 (2004) (recommending
courts consider statutory history and legislative intent only where other statutory
construction tools do not provide a clear resolution to the ambiguity, and the history helps
to add more clarity than confusion).
136. See Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(cautioning against adherence to legislative history because of the lack of bipartisan
participation and negotiation).
137. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60–61 (1988) (dismissing legislative history as solely
indicative of the drafters’ intent, not the statute’s intent); see also Towne v. Eisner, 245
U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.”).
138. See generally S. REP. NO. 88-1580 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3788 (emphasis added) (“The proposed revision of section 1782, set forth in section 9(a)
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Furthermore, the legislative history of § 1782(a) suggests a permissive
reading of the ambiguity, not the restrictive reading the Second and Fifth
Circuits follow.139
Congress revised § 1782(a) in 1964 to pertain broadly to tribunals, not just
courts.140 This purposeful liberalization opened U.S. courts to discovery
requests from interested parties in foreign arbitration.141 Upon passage of
the 1964 Amendments to § 1782(a), the Senate released a report detailing its
purpose and aims in liberalizing the language of the statute, contradicting the
restrictive view of the Second and Fifth Circuits.142 The main purpose of
retooling § 1782(a), the Senate Report details, was to assist with discovery
requests for proceedings before foreign tribunals.143
The legislative history of § 1782(a) does not explicitly exclude
international commercial arbitration, and the Sixth Circuit properly held that
the district court’s broad authority to compel discovery, curtailed by the Intel
discretionary factors, is a reasonable construction of § 1782(a).144 The
Senate Report demonstrates that district court judges have the ultimate
gatekeeping authority when granting § 1782(a) requests; Congress
constructed the statute with a broad interpretation of “tribunal” that would
be limited by the district court judge.145 Therefore, the Second and Fifth
clarifies and liberalizes existing U.S. procedures for assisting foreign and international
tribunals . . . .”).
139. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710, 727–28 (6th Cir. 2019)
(acknowledging the successive steps taken by Congress to liberalize international
arbitration discovery rules through changes to § 1782(a) and disagreeing with the overly
restrictive reading of the legislative history by the Second and Fifth Circuits).
140. See generally S. REP. NO. 88-1580 (opening U.S. courts to assist broadly in
judicial proceedings, including tribunals).
141. See generally id. (liberalizing the applicability of § 1782(a) to include
international tribunals and extend beyond conventional courts).
142. Compare NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188–89 (2d Cir. 1999)
(establishing that the authors of the Senate and House Reports had clearly stated what
constituted a tribunal), and Kaz. v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881–82 (5th Cir.
1999) (narrowing congressional interpretation of the statute), with S. REP. NO. 88–1580,
at 3782 (granting district courts broad authority to compel discovery).
143. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 3782 (“The purpose of the proposed legislation is to
improve U.S. judicial procedures for — (1) Serving documents in the United States in
connection with proceedings before foreign and international tribunals.”).
144. See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939
F.3d at 726 (recognizing that the broad authority of district courts is reined in by the Intel
discretionary factors). See generally S. REP. NO. 88-1580 (making no mention of the still
primitive international commercial arbitration tribunals that would gain popularity
abroad following the amendments to § 1782(a) in 1964).
145. See S. REP. NO. 88–1580, at 3788–90 (clarifying that assistance is open to all
proceedings before a foreign court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and that the district
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Circuits improperly identified § 1782(a) as the primary limitation on
discovery, not the district court judge as Intel and ALJ provide.146
The Senate Report cites Hans Smit’s International Litigation Under the
United States Code, a law review article written by a professor who helped
draft the 1964 Amendments to clarify the term “tribunal.”147 Smit’s
definition, although not dispositive, broadly includes adjudicative bodies of
all kinds.148 The Second Circuit only recognizes the authority of Smit’s
article insofar as it claims that international tribunals are the result of an
international agreement.149 An international agreement is an ambiguous
term broad enough to include the private tribunal in ALJ created by an
international agreement between the DIFC and the LCIA.150
Although Congress’s policy intentions when drafting and amending §
1782(a) are not controlling, they may supply some insight when determining
the intended statutory function.151 The United States’ unique position as a
global economic leader may influence other countries to adopt similar
discovery standards in international arbitration.152 Out-of-court dispute
resolution methods are becoming more common; Congress’s intention to
court judge ultimately decides whether the dispute at issue needs judicial assistance from
U.S. courts).
146. Compare NBC, 165 F.3d at 188–89 (misinterpreting the scope of § 1782 based
on its legislative history), and Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 881–82 (stating § 1782 is limited
and should be interpreted based on Congress’s deliberate intentions), with Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 259 (2004) (“Nothing suggests that this
amendment was an endeavor to rein in, rather than to confirm, by way of example, the
broad range of discovery authorized in 1964.”), and In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F.3d at 725–26 (establishing the Second
and Fifth Circuits’ misconceptions of the statute).
147. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 3788.
148. Smit, International Litigation, supra note 38, at 1026 n.71 (“The term ‘tribunal’
embraces all bodies exercising adjudicatory powers, and includes . . . arbitral
tribunals . . . .”).
149. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190 (concluding that Congress intended to include
intergovernmental arbitral tribunals in its 1964 Amendments).
150. See Overview, DIFC-LCIA ARB. CTR., supra note 79 (describing the DIFC-
LCIA as a joint venture between the two arbitration groups for the purpose of making
Dubai a regional hub for international commercial arbitration and mediation).
151. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 536 (1980) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne,
60 U.S. 183, 194 (1856)) (stressing the importance of considering “the objects and policy
of the law” alongside the statute’s text).
152. Compare Miller et al., supra note 19, at 45 (recognizing that Congress’s intent
to influence foreign countries’ discovery laws in arbitration have thus far failed to
materialize), with Richard Wike et al., Globally, More Name U.S. than China as World’s
Leading Economic Power, PEW RES. CTR. (July 13, 2017), https://www.pew
research.org/global/2017/07/13/more-name-u-s-than-china-as-worlds-leading-
economic-power/ (labeling the United States as the global economic superpower
influencing economies abroad).
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broadly open discovery to first-instance decisionmaking bodies would
include international commercial arbitration as it becomes more
commonplace.153 Following the passage of § 1782(a), the U.S. Supreme
Court’s disposition towards international commercial arbitration has
followed Congress’s.154 Foreign corporations would likely be hesitant to
contract with U.S. corporations if U.S. courts stonewalled judicial assistance
to those foreign entities.155 Congress’s policy intentions suggest a
permissive reading of § 1782(a) to allow discovery aid in international
commercial tribunals.156
iii. The Federal Arbitration Act and the Role of District Court Judges
in International Commercial Arbitration
The Second and Fifth Circuits incorrectly inferred that the constraints of
the Federal Arbitration Act and 9 U.S.C. § 7 implicitly restricted the
construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).157 The Federal Arbitration Act only
applies to domestic arbitration, where discovery rules are a matter of contract
and courts will not intervene unless there is a clear abuse of discovery
power.158 Parties willingly submit to domestic arbitration as an alternative
153. See S. REP. NO. 88–1580, at 3788–89 (“In view of the constant growth of
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings all over the world, the necessity for
obtaining evidence in the United States may be as impelling before a foreign
administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in proceedings before a conventional
foreign court.”); see also Markus Altenkirch & Malika Boussihmad, International
Arbitration Statistics 2018 — Another Busy Year for Arbitral Institutions, GLOB. ARB.
NEWS (July 2, 2019) https://globalarbitrationnews.com/international-arbitration-
statistics-2018-another-busy-year-for-arbitral-institutions/ (observing a fifty-percent
increase in resolved disputes through arbitration from 2013 to 2018).
154. SeeM/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (“The expansion
of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if . . . we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.”);
see also id. (“We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international
waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.”).
155. Todd Weiler et al., Are United States Courts Receptive to International
Arbitration?, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 869, 890 (2012) (encouraging U.S. courts to
embrace a more liberal and receptive discovery standard, such as the one adopted by
Canada, to increase parity between international parties).
156. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 3788–89 (granting district courts broad authority to
compel discovery in foreign tribunals).
157. SeeNBC v. Bear Stearns, & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999); see alsoKaz.
v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999).
158. See George E. Lieberman, Discovery in an Arbitration Proceeding and
Appealing an Award Under the Federal Arbitration Act: It’s Not That Simple (and What
You Do Not Know Can Hurt You), FED. LAW., May 2009, at 54, 54
https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/discoveryinarbitrationmay2009-
pdf-1.pdf (stating that without an overreach “by the party with greater bargaining power,
the courts will respect what the parties contracted for in terms of discovery” under the
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to burdensome and costly litigation.159 Because the parties control the
discovery rules, the Federal Arbitration Act grants discovery power to
arbitrators to balance their power with the parties’ power.160
Discovery in international commercial arbitration in a special economic
zone, such as the DIFC, is not necessarily a matter of contract.161 U.S. parties
must submit to foreign discovery procedures of the arbitral panel that may
weaken their ability to resolve disputes.162 As a result, § 1782(a) grants
district courts the authority to assist in discovery requests to balance the
power between U.S. parties, foreign parties, and arbitrators.163 Although 9
U.S.C. § 7 grants arbitrators discovery power to balance the power disparity
between arbitrator and party, 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) grants parties and
interested persons discovery power through district courts to balance the
power disparity between domestic parties, foreign parties, and arbitrators.164
Following the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Second Circuit reinforced the
district court judge’s role in equalizing the power imbalance between parties
to an arbitration.165 The Second Circuit clarified that § 1782(a) permits
district courts to compel discovery of extraterritorial materials.166 As a
result, domestic parties to an international commercial arbitration would
enjoy the same privileges to compel extraterritorial materials as an
Federal Arbitration Act).
159. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 UNIV. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (attributing the increase in arbitration rate and decrease in trial rate
from 1962 to 2002 to the cost, delays, and risks associated with trial).
160. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2018) (granting discovery power in domestic arbitration
exclusively to arbitrators).
161. See generally DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Rules 2016, DIFC-LCIA ARB. CTR. (Oct.
1, 2016), http://www.difc-lcia.org/arbitration-rules-2016.aspx (establishing that when
operating within the DIFC, there are specific arbitral rules parties must follow as opposed
to parties being able to contract arbitral rules themselves).
162. But seeCarolyn B. Lamm et al., International Arbitration in a Globalized World,
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2014, at 4, 5 (recommending several well-established
arbitration panels’ rules to avoid unforeseen intrusive discovery).
163. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004)
(giving greater weight to § 1782(a) requests from nonparticipants in the first Intel
discretionary inquiry, implying that the district court judge resolves power imbalances
in international arbitration through § 1782(a) authority).
164. 9 U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018).
165. See In re Del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 533–34 (2d Cir. 2019); see also id. at
533 (quoting Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 2015)) (“[W]e have instructed
that it is far preferable for a district court to reconcile whatever misgivings it may have
about the impact of its participation in the foreign litigation by issuing a closely tailored
discovery order rather than by simply denying relief outright.”).
166. See id. at 533–34 (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize
extraterritorial discovery).
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international party’s privilege to compel domestic materials.167
IV. NECESSITY FORUNIFIEDAPPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)
The Sixth Circuit’s deviation from the Second and Fifth Circuits’
precedents regarding discovery in international commercial arbitration will
inevitably lead to foreign litigants and arbitral parties forum shopping for
judicial assistance.168 To prevent inconsistent standards in discovery,
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court should address this issue directly.
Before the passage of the 1964 Amendments to § 1782(a), Congress
assembled a group of legal experts to retool the statute.169 This group altered
the statute to reflect changes in the global economy and arbitration.170
Congress should likewise convene another commission with the sole intent
to address discovery in international commercial arbitration. The
commission should work with lawmakers to enact effective, easily
interpretable legislation for district and appeals courts to follow. This
commission should aim to codify the Intel authority inquiry and the
discretionary inquiry to provide further guidance on how courts should
interpret these factors. The commission should also reaffirm the district
court’s role as a negotiator between the parties, balancing the power disparity
between U.S. parties, foreign parties, and foreign arbitrators. The district
court should have the authority to limit the discovery requests, limit the
purpose for which the evidence is entered, and negotiate an exchange of
documents, where appropriate.
Congress should quickly enact the proposed changes by this commission
and further publish a legislative report detailing the tribunals entertained
under § 1782(a).171 Congress should specifically identify arbitral panels that
167. See id.; see alsoMarisa Marinelli et al., Discovery in International Arbitration:
The Ever-Expanding Scope, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.hk
law.com/en/insights/publications/2019/10/discovery-in-international-arbitration-the-
ever-expanding-scope (arguing that courts granting private arbitration applications
provide an advantage to non-domestic parties seeking discovery from U.S.-based
entities).
168. See Kenneth Beale et al., Solving the § 1782 Puzzle: Bringing Certainty to the
Debate Over 28 U.S.C. § 1782’s Application to International Arbitration, 47 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 51, 93 (2011) (outlining how inconsistent rulings on § 1782 have created an
incentive for foreign companies to forum shop for jurisdictions with less restrictive
interpretations of the statute).
169. SeeMiller et al., supra note 19, at 45 (highlighting the success of the commission
and Congress’s acceptance of the 1964 Amendments).
170. See id. (illustrating how the federal courts’ review of § 1782(a) cases
underscored Congress’s aim of refitting the statute for “modern commercial needs”).
171. See Beale et al., supra note 168, at 93 (highlighting the harmful impact of
inconsistent judicial interpretations of § 1782(a)).
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fall within the purview of the second Intel discretionary factor, the nature of
the tribunal, and its receptivity to U.S. courts.172 Additional credence should
be granted to arbitral panels that have adopted the rules of one of the
whitelisted arbitral panels, such as the DIFC-LCIA.
Absent clear direction from Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court should
address this issue to resolve any potential forum shopping. The U.S.
Supreme Court can often react to changes in legal standards faster than
Congress, although later congressional action may supersede the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling. Although no petition for a writ of certiorari has
been filed, FedEx should challenge the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that the district
court had the authority, but not the obligation, to assist in discovery. On
appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court should affirm the Sixth Circuit’s judgment.
The U.S. Supreme Court should further support its authority and
discretionary factors from Intel by providing additional guidance on how to
interpret and adjudicate on those factors. The U.S. Supreme Court should
explicitly abrogate the decisions in NBC and Biedermann to prevent
confusion among the lower courts.
If the U.S. Supreme Court does not clarify whether international
commercial arbitration tribunals fall within the scope of § 1782(a), district
and appeals courts should err towards liberal discovery authority to provide
equitable and reliable relief to arbitral parties. In the interests of international
comity and parity, district courts should follow the Sixth Circuit’s permissive
construction of § 1782(a).173
Finally, on remand, the district court should deny ALJ’s request for
discovery assistance in connection with the DIFC-LCIA tribunal. As
previously noted, the first and third discretionary factors from Intel heavily
favor the respondents, and therefore, the request should be denied. The Sixth
Circuit properly overturned the denial of discovery assistance based on a lack
of district court authority, however, that does not necessarily suggest that the
district court should grant the discovery request. Instead, the district court
should deny the request, not on the grounds of lack of authorization, but
rather, as the requests were made to a party to the arbitration and the request
172. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264–65 (2004)
(recommending district courts consider the nature of the discovery request, the nature of
the tribunal, “attempt[s] to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions,” and the
burden placed on the party against which the discovery is sought).
173. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710, 732 (6th Cir. 2019); see also
Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 261 (“While comity and parity concerns may be important as
touchstones for a district court’s exercise of discretion in particular cases, they do not
permit our insertion of a generally applicable foreign-discoverability rule into the text of
§ 1782(a).”).
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was an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions.
Regardless of the outcome of a congressional statute or a U.S. Supreme
Court decision, a unifying standard for discovery in international
commercial arbitration is necessary. Foreign parties will be less likely to
contract with U.S. companies if there is legal uncertainty surrounding how
evidence will be gathered in the event of a contractual dispute.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit properly decided Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation Co.
v. FedEx Corp. when the court found that international commercial
arbitration tribunals fall under the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). The Sixth
Circuit correctly applied the Intel authority test to determine that district
courts have the authority, but not the obligation, to assist in discovery
requests. On remand, the district court will determine whether ALJ’s
discovery request should be granted under the Intel discretionary factors.
The need for consistent discovery standards in the evolving body of
international commercial arbitration will only increase as the prevalence of
such arbitration increases. The Sixth Circuit’s proper application of the Intel
authority test should be adopted by other jurisdictions to promote efficacious
out-of-court dispute resolution.
